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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant, Keefe Martin, appeals the July 26, 1996, order 
of the district court dismissing his complaint with 
prejudice. The district court held that Section 118 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement between Martin's union and his 
employer, appellee Dana Corporation Parish Division 
(Dana), bar Martin from bringing his discrimination claim 
in federal court. The collective bargaining agreement 
between Dana and the union provides that both the 
employee and the union retain the individual right to 
demand arbitration. Based on the language of the collective 
bargaining agreement, we hold that Martin is required to 
arbitrate his discrimination claim pursuant to the grievance 




Dana manufactures light industrial products. Keefe 
Martin, a Dana employee, has been a welder in Dana's 
Reading, Pennsylvania facility since September 13, 1983. In 
1993, Martin filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against 
Dana and a lawsuit against Dana, his union (the United 
Steelworkers of America, Local 3733), and various Dana 
managers and union officers alleging racial discrimination 
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994), and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (1994). Specifically, he alleged that after returning to 
work following an injury, he was restricted from light duty 
work because he is African-American. In early 1995, after 
discovery, motions for summary judgment by all the 
defendants, and extensive settlement discussions, Martin 
signed a stipulation voluntarily dismissing his action with 
prejudice. 
 
Less than four months later, Martin filed a second charge 
of discrimination with the EEOC against Dana. This charge 
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similarly alleged improper assignments within the restricted 
duty program due to Martin's status as an African- 
American. The EEOC issued Martin a right-to-sue letter, 
and Martin again filed suit against Dana, along with a 
motion for appointment of counsel. The district court 
granted Martin's motion for appointment of counsel, and 
Martin's attorney filed an amended complaint on his behalf. 
 
In response to the amended complaint, Dana filed a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to FED.R.C IV.P 12(b)(6). Dana 
argued that Martin's suit should be dismissed for his 
failure to arbitrate his claims under the 1994 collective 
bargaining agreement between Dana and the Union. Article 
1, Section 3 of that agreement provides: 
 
Any and all claims regarding equal employment 
opportunity provided for under this Agreement or 
under any federal, state or local fair employment 
practice law shall be exclusively addressed by an 
individual employee or the Union under the grievance 
and arbitration provisions of this Agreement. 
 
Appellant's Br. App. at 85. The district court granted 
Dana's motion and dismissed Martin's claim with prejudice. 
The district court's order contained a footnote explaining 
the reasoning for its decision. The footnote stated in full: 
 
This is a question of first impression in this Circuit. 
Section 3 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
applicable to plaintiff expressly requires arbitration of 
all types of employment claims. Under Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011 (1971), 
such a clause would not bar this suit. Since Alexander, 
Congress has amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
to provide for alternate dispute resolution in Section 
118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, 105 
Stat. 108. Although codified at 42 U.S.C. Section 1981A,1 
Section 118 applies to Title VII. In our view, this 
amendment and the provisions of the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement bar this suit. Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 118 is actually not codified but is set out as a note under 
section 1981. 
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1647 (1991); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass 
Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 
Martin v. Dana Corp., No. 95-8024, slip op. at 1 n.1 (E.D. 




Both parties contend that the appropriate standard of 
review is plenary based on the fact that we are reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment. However, the July 26, 1996, 
order of the district court from which Martin appeals states 
that the district court granted Dana's motion to dismiss 
pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P 12(b)(6), not pursuant to 
FED.R.CIV.P 56. Id. at 1. Rule 12(b) provides that if, on a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), 
 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as 
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided 
in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56. 
 
FED.R.CIV.P 12(b). "It is . . . well-established that prior to 
converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment, the district court must provide adequate notice 
to the parties." Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 578 (3d 
Cir. 1996)(citing Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 
1989)). Nowhere in the record is it suggested that the 
district court converted Dana's motion to dismiss into a 
motion for summary judgment. The district court's terse 
July 26, 1996, order does not indicate that it considered 
any documents outside of the pleadings in the course of 
disposing of Dana's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we are 
reviewing a grant of a motion to dismiss, not a grant of a 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
While the standard of review is still plenary, Rose, 871 
F.2d at 342, the test is not whether "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on 
file, together with affidavits . . . show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
parties [are] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
 
                                4 
Appellant's Br. at 10 (citing Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts Inc., 
814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1987)). Instead, the proper inquiry is: 
 
[W]hether taking the allegations of the complaint as 
true, . . . and viewing them liberally, giving plaintiffs 
the benefit of all inferences which fairly may be drawn 
therefrom, . . . "it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] 
claim[s] which would entitle them to relief." 
 
Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1175 (3d Cir. 
1992)(quoting Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 444 




In this appeal we are presented with an issue offirst 
impression for the Third Circuit. Actually, given the precise 
factual situation with which we are dealing (an arbitration 
clause in a collective bargaining agreement under which 
either the employee or the union can compel arbitration), it 
appears that this case may be different from all of the 
relevant cases previously addressed by the other courts. We 
embark on our analysis by surveying these earlier related 
cases. 
 
We begin with a unanimous United States Supreme 
Court decision upon which Martin heavily relies, Alexander 
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011 (1974). 
In Alexander, a black employee brought a Title VII suit 
against his employer. The employee was a member of a 
bargaining unit represented by a union that had a collective 
bargaining agreement with the employer. Prior to the 
commencement of the Title VII suit and pursuant to the 
grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining 
agreement, the union brought the employee's claim to 
arbitration. The arbitrator determined that the employee 
"had been `discharged for just cause.' " Id. at 42, 94 S.Ct. 
at 1017. The employer contended that the employee's prior 
submission of the claim to final arbitration precluded the 
Title VII suit. 
 
The Supreme Court disagreed and held that "Title VII's 
purpose and procedures strongly suggest that an individual 
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does not forfeit his private cause of action if he first 
pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the 
nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining 
agreement." Id. at 49, 94 S.Ct. at 1020. In other words, "a 
person may sue under Title VII notwithstanding that he has 
submitted his claims to arbitration under a collective 
bargaining agreement and lost." Austin v. Owens-Brockway 
Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 886 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(Hall, J., dissenting)(citing Alexander, 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 
1011 (1974)). The Court further stated that "there can be 
no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title 
VII." Alexander. 415 U.S. at 51, 94 S.Ct. at 1021. The Court 
explained that because Title VII "concerns not majoritarian 
processes, but an individual's right to equal employment 
opportunities," such rights "can form no part of the 
collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights 
would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind 
Title VII." Id. at 51, 94 S.Ct. at 1021 (emphasis added). The 
Court continued, "[i]n these circumstances, an employee's 
rights under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective 
waiver." Id. at 51-52, 94 S.Ct. at 1021. (citing Wilko v. 
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182 (1953)). The Court's 
holding is grounded in the distinction between disputes 
arising from the collective bargaining agreement itself and 
disputes concerning an employee's statutory rights. 
 
After Alexander, the Supreme Court continued to rely on 
this crucial distinction. See McDonald v. City of West 
Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 1804 (1984) 
(involving claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 
728, 101 S.Ct. 1437 (1981) (involving claim under Fair 
Labor Standards Act). In both of these cases the Court 
emphasized that grievance procedures under collective 
bargaining agreements protect only contractual rights. See 
id. Just as in Alexander, in these cases the Court expressed 
its concern that the "majoritarian" nature of the collective 
bargaining process "in which the balancing of individual 
and collective interests [occurs,] might lead a union to 
sacrifice statutorily granted benefits." Randolph v. Cooper 
Indus., 879 F. Supp. 518, 521 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (citing 
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51, 94 S.Ct. at 1021 and Barrentine, 
450 U.S. at 742, 101 S.Ct. at 1445-46); see also McDonald, 
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466 U.S. at 291, 104 S.Ct. at 1803. The Court "concluded 
that this tension between individual and group interests 
should not be permitted to compromise statutory rights 
conferred by Congress on individual employees." Randolph, 
879 F. Supp. at 521 (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51, 94 
S.Ct. at 1021 and Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 742, 101 S.Ct. at 
1445-46). 
 
Leaving Alexander and its progeny, we next turn to the 
other major case in this area -- the case upon which Dana 
places great importance, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991). As part of his 
employment, the plaintiff in Gilmer registered as a 
securities representative with several stock exchanges 
including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In his 
registration statement with the NYSE, the employee 
" `agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy' 
arising between him and [his employer]." Gilmer, 500 U.S. 
at 23, 111 S.Ct. at 1650 (first alteration in original). 
 
The employee was fired at the age of 62. He then brought 
suit in federal court, alleging that his employer terminated 
his employment because of his age, in violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as 
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1985). The employer filed 
a motion to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim. The 
Supreme Court held that an ADEA claim "can be subjected 
to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration 
agreement in a securities registration application." Gilmer, 
500 U.S. at 23, 111 S.Ct. at 1650. The Court stated: 
 
Although all statutory claims may not be appropriate 
for arbitration, "[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, 
the party should be held to it unless Congress itself 
has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of 
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." In 
this regard, we note that the burden is on Gilmer to 
show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a 
judicial forum for ADEA claims. If such an intention 
exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the ADEA, 
its legislative history, or an "inherent conflict" between 
arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purposes. 
Throughout such an inquiry, it should be kept in mind 
 
                                7 
that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed 
with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring 
arbitration." 
 
Id. at 26, 111 S.Ct. at 1652 (alteration in original)(citations 
omitted). 
 
The Court concluded that "nothing in the text of the 
ADEA or its legislative history explicitly precludes 
arbitration." Id. It also found that"compulsory arbitration 
of ADEA claims pursuant to arbitration agreements [is not] 
inconsistent with the statutory framework and purposes of 
the ADEA." Id. at 27, 111 S.Ct. at 1652. 
 
Gilmer did not overrule Alexander. Rather, the Court 
stated that reliance on Alexander and its progeny was 
"misplaced" because "[t]here are several important 
distinctions between the [Alexander] line of cases and 
[Gilmer]." Id. at 33, 35, 111 S.Ct. at 1656, 1657. First, the 
Court noted that Alexander and Gilmer involved different 
issues. The issue in Alexander was "whether arbitration of 
contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial 
resolution of statutory claims." Id. at 35, 111 S.Ct. at 1657. 
The issue in Gilmer was "the enforceability of an agreement 
to arbitrate statutory claims." Id. 
 
Second, and most important to our discussion about the 
instant case, the Court noted that "because the arbitration 
in [Alexander and its progeny] occurred in the context of a 
collective-bargaining agreement, the claimants there were 
represented by their unions in the arbitration proceedings. 
An important concern therefore was the tension between 
collective representation and individual statutory rights, a 
concern not applicable to [Gilmer]." Id. Specifically, in 
Alexander the Court was worried about "the potential 
disparity in interests between a union and an employee." 
Id. 
 
Finally, the Court placed importance on the fact that 
Gilmer, unlike Alexander, was "decided under the FAA 
[Federal Arbitration Act], which . . . reflects a `liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements.' " Id. (quoting 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. V. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 625, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3353 (1985)). 
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Since Gilmer, courts have repeatedly held that Title VII 
claims, like ADEA claims, are subject to mandatory 
arbitration. See, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass 
Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996); Metz v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 
1994); Nghiem v. NEC Electronic, Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th 
Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 
698 (11th Cir. 1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 
956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991). 
However, only one of these cases arose in the context of a 
collective bargaining agreement. See Austin, 78 F.3d 875 
(4th Cir. 1996). The other cases all involved arbitration 
clauses in employment contracts and securities registration 
applications. Thus, out of the above-mentioned cases, 
Austin is the one closest to the case at hand. 
 
In addition to the above cases, "[t]he language of [Title 
VII] could not be any more clear in showing Congressional 
favor towards arbitration [of Title VII discrimination 
claims]." Id. at 881. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, amending 
Title VII, provides: 
 
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, 
the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, 
including . . . arbitration, is encouraged to resolve 
disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal 
law amended by this title. 
 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 
Stat. 1071, 1081. This statutory language certainly 
undermines the portion of the Supreme Court's Alexander 
opinion expressing a mistrust of the arbitral process. 
Further, analyzed under the test set forth in Gilmer, this 
language demonstrates that Congress did not intend "to 
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies" for Title VII claims 
in general. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 111 S.Ct. at 1652. 
Nonetheless neither this statutory language nor the 
Supreme Court's statement in Gilmer that "statutory claims 
may be the subject of an arbitration agreement," id., 
specifically speaks to the situation where arbitration is 
compelled by a collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, an 
employee subject to an arbitration clause in a collective 
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bargaining agreement where only the union can compel 
arbitration presents a situation where "compulsory 
arbitration of [the employee's Title VII] claims . . . would be 
inconsistent with the statutory framework and purposes of 
[Title VII]." Id. at 27, 111 S.Ct. at 1652. In such a situation 
Alexander would control. 
 
In addition to the Fourth Circuit in Austin, two other 
circuit courts and a few other district courts have 
addressed the issue of whether an arbitration clause in a 
collective bargaining agreement can bar an employee from 
bringing a Title VII claim in federal court. See Pryner v. 
Tractor Supply Company, 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Varner v. National Super Market, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 
(8th Cir. 1996); Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of NY, No. 
95-1458, 1997 WL 149328 (D. Conn. Mar. 13, 1997); Bush 
v. Carrier Air Conditioning, 940 F. Supp. 1040 (E.D. Tex. 
1996); Randolph v. Cooper Indus., 879 F. Supp. 518 (W.D. 
Pa. 1994). In contrast to Austin, all of these cases except 
Almonte, have held that employees cannot be compelled by 
a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate federal 
statutory discrimination claims. Not surprisingly, the 
difference in outcome is due to the fact that Austin and 
Almonte placed emphasis on Gilmer, whereas Pryner, 
Varner, Bush, and Randolph all viewed Alexander as 
controlling. Further, whereas Austin did not find 
importance in whether an arbitration clause appeared in a 
collective bargaining agreement or an employment contract, 
Pryner and the other cases found the difference dispositive. 
In addition, the courts in Bush and Randolph emphasized 
the fact that the language in their particular collective 
bargaining agreements did not explicitly provide for the 
mandatory arbitration of statutory discrimination claims. 
See Bush, 940 F. Supp. at 1046; Randolph, 879 F. Supp. at 
522. 
 
Austin held that "[w]hether the dispute arises under a 
contract of employment growing out of securities 
registration application, a simple employment contract, or a 
collective bargaining agreement, an agreement has yet been 
made to arbitrate the dispute. So long as the agreement is 
voluntary, it is valid, and we are of opinion it should be 
enforced." Austin, 78 F.3d at 885. It further stated that the 
employee in that case was 
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a party to a voluntary agreement to submit statutory 
claims to arbitration. The collective bargaining 
agreement specifically lists gender . . . discrimination 
as [a] claim[ ] that [is] subject to arbitration. This 
voluntary agreement is consistent with the text of Title 
VII . . ., the legislative intent behind [that] statute[ ], 
and the purpose[ ] of [that] statute[ ]. 
 
Id. at 885-86. 
 
Similarly, in a case involving the arbitrability of 
discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in the 
context of a collective bargaining agreement, one court 
found importance in the fact that "Congress has expressly 
encouraged arbitration of § 1981 claims." Almonte, 1997 WL 
149328, at *5. Almonte held that a "less stringent 
interpretation of [Alexander] is found to be a more 
reasonable accommodation of the conflict between vitiating 
individual statutory rights and enforcing the express terms 
of a fairly negotiated contract than a per se rule barring 
enforcement of [collective bargaining agreement-] mandated 
arbitration of individual statutory claims." Id. at *4. 
 
In contrast to Austin and Almonte, Pryner focused on the 
"essential conflict . . . between majority and minority 
rights." Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362. The Seventh Circuit found 
important the fact that "the grievance and arbitration 
procedure can be invoked only by the union, and not by the 
worker." Id. The court continued, "[t]he worker has to 
persuade the union to prosecute his grievance and if it 
loses in the early stages of the grievance proceedings to 
submit the grievance to arbitration." Id. It further stated 
that "we may not assume that [the union] will be highly 
sensitive to [minority workers'] special interests, which are 
the interests protected by Title VII and the other 
discrimination statutes and will seek to vindicate those 
interests with maximum vigor." Id. at 362-63. 
 
In the instant appeal we are presented with a case that 
appears to be different from all of the above related cases. 
This case involves an arbitration clause under which both 
the employee and the union can compel arbitration. At oral 
argument, the parties agreed that in Pryner the employee 
did not have the right to initiate the arbitration. However, 
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they suggested that, like the instant case, Austin and 
Varner also involved situations where the employee could 
arbitrate at his election as well as the election of the union. 
This factual assertion is not evident from either the district 
or appellate opinions of those cases. Therefore, in view of 
this distinguishing fact, the instant case is more compelling 
than Austin, which did not differentiate between arbitration 
clauses in collective bargaining agreements and arbitration 
clauses in employment contracts.2 
 
Moreover, this case is distinguishable from Pryner and 
the other cases that have adhered to a strict reading of 
Alexander. Because Martin, as an employee, does not need 
"to persuade the union to prosecute his grievance and . . . 
submit [his] grievance to arbitration," Pryner, 109 F.3d at 
362, there is not the same "tension between individual and 
group interests." Randolph, 879 F. Supp. at 521. Thus, 
there is not a concern about a "potential disparity in 
interests between [the] union and [the] employee." Gilmer, 
500 U.S. at 35, 111 S.Ct. at 1657. For these reasons, in 
this specific situation where the individual employee can 
compel arbitration, Gilmer, not Alexander, should control. 
 
We note that another determinative factor in our 
decision-making is the fact that the language of the 
collective bargaining agreement in this case explicitly 
provides for the mandatory arbitration of statutory 
discrimination claims. Article 1, Section 3 of the agreement 
provides: 
 
Any and all claims regarding equal employment 
opportunity provided for under this Agreement or under 
any federal, state or local fair employment practice law 
shall be exclusively addressed by an individual 
employee or the Union under the grievance and 
arbitration provisions of this Agreement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. If the parties' assertion about the employees' ability to initiate 
arbitration under the collective bargaining agreements in Austin and 
Varner is correct, our opinion is not affected in any way. Neither Austin 
nor Varner commented on what we find to be the critical distinguishing 
factor -- the employee's ability individually to initiate arbitration. 
Therefore, although the outcome of this case is akin to that in Austin, we 
arrive at the same conclusion by utilizing different reasoning. 
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Appellant's Br. App. at 85 (emphasis added). We find that 
the language requiring compulsory arbitration of Title VII- 
type claims, along with the language giving "an individual 
employee" the right to initiate the grievance and arbitration 




The district court was correct in finding that Martin's suit 
was barred by the arbitration clause in the collective 
bargaining agreement. We will affirm the district court's 
July 25, 1996, order granting Dana's motion to dismiss the 
complaint. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
 
There are few current issues in federal labor law more 
central than the one presented in this case: whether a 
collective bargaining agreement can compel the arbitration 
of a federal Title VII discrimination claim. 
 
But for Martin's right to initiate and prosecute his 
grievance without union approval, this case would present 
an irreconcilable conflict between individual and group 
interests. This was the situation faced by the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Pryner v. Tractor Supply 
Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 65 
U.S.L.W. 2622 (U.S. May 16, 1997)(No. 96-1830), and 
decided in favor of the employee.1 Nevertheless, the issue 
here remains whether a union can waive Martin's statutory 
rights in a collective bargaining agreement that specifically 
provides that arbitration is the exclusive remedy for equal 
employment opportunity claims. 
 
The answer, it seems to me, in large part depends on the 
continued vitality of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 4l5 U.S. 36, 51 
(1974)("[W]e think it clear that there can be no prospective 
waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII."). "Title VII 
. . . concerns not majoritarian processes, but an 
individual's right to equal employment opportunities. . . 
[and] waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount 
congressional purpose behind Title VII." Id. Until the 
Supreme Court signals otherwise, I am reluctant to hold 
that a collective bargaining agreement may preclude an 
individual from exercising his statutory civil rights. 
 
Martin contends he is entitled to pursue independently 
(and perhaps collaterally) his statutory rights under Title 
VII. Despite his right to initiate grievance proceedings, 
Martin contends that enough tension exists between his 
interests and those of the union (and other employees) that 
he should not be held to have waived his statutory rights. 
Of particular significance in this case alleging racial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. But see Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 
(4th Cir.) (unclear whether employee could initiate arbitration), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996). 
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discrimination is that Martin is one of 75 African- 
Americans in the 2,300 member Local 3733 Union. It would 
appear, therefore, that the tension between individual and 
collective rights spills over to a tension between racial 
minority and majority rights.2 
 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 
(1991), is not especially helpful here. As an individual, 
Gilmer agreed to arbitrate all future employment claims. 
Consequently, Gilmer did not address the majoritarian 
concerns discussed in Alexander. 
 
The question remains whether Congress' 1991 
amendment to Title VII encouraging arbitration where 
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, permits a 
collective bargaining unit to prospectively waive an 
individual member's rights to select a federal judicial 
forum. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 195 
Stat. 108, § 118. If Congress intended to allow such a 
waiver, it did not explicitly say so. Moreover, it is 
questionable to assume that in the 1991 Amendments, 
Congress provided civil rights plaintiffs with a right to trial 
by jury in one section, and then severely limited that right 
in another. See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 363. Also it may be 
significant that Alexander was not listed in the legislative 
history among the cases affected by § 118. See H.R. Rep. 
No. 102-40(I) at 97 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
549. 
 
When an individual worker agrees to arbitrate an 
employment discrimination dispute, it must be submitted 
to an arbitrator. But absent individual consent, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Pryner court observed that while "the collective-bargaining 
agreement is the symbol and reality of a majoritarian conception of 
workers' rights," such ideas do not belong in the context of "[t]he 
statutory rights at issue in these two cases [which] are rights given to 
members of minority groups because of concern about the mistreatment 
(of which there is a long history in the labor movement . . .) of minorities 
by majorities." Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362 (citations omitted). 
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There are strong policy reasons weighing for and against 
the arbitration of federal discrimination claims. But these 
choices rest with Congress. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




3. See Deborah Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 96- 
2587, 1997 WL 236237, at *5 (8th Cir. May 12, 1997) ("Accordingly, we 
have held that arbitration agreements contained within a [collective 
bargaining agreement] do not bar civil claims under Title VII".). 
employee retains his right to statutory relief. See Alexander, 
415 U.S. 36.3                                 
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